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SEARCHES OF PRIVATE PAPERS: INCORPORATING FIRST
AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES INTO THE DETERMINATION OF
OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS
INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment' guarantee against unlawful searches re-
quires a threshold determination by courts whether the individual
challenging the intrusion had a reasonable expectation of privacy with
respect to the place that was searched.2 Since the landmark Supreme
Court case of Katz v. United States,3 this expectation of privacy has
been gauged with a two-part test. The first part of this test is subjec-
tive: Did the individual manifest an expectation of privacy by keeping
the object undisclosed to others?4 The particular expectation of pri-
vacy manifested must also meet a second, objective test: Is society
prepared to regard such an expectation as reasonable? 5
1. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
2. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (Capacity to claim protection
depends on whether the claimant "has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
invaded place."); United States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960, 963 & n.4 (1st Cir. 1982)
("first inquiry"); United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1154 ("threshold" determi-
nation), modified on other grounds per curiam, 664 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982); United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 329 (2d Cir.)
("starting point"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980); see J. Hall, Search and Seizure
§ 1:1, at 3 (1982) (fundamental question).
3. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The subjective portion of the test gener-
ally encompasses an inquiry into the expressed state of mind of the individual at the
time of the incident, Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 & n.3 (1980) (petitioner
admitted he did not believe the object would be free from governmental intrusion);
United States v. Hawkins, 681 F.2d 1343, 1346 (11th Cir.) (unsolicited affirmative
disavowal of ownership), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 354 (1982), and the nature of the
precautions taken by the individual to insure privacy, United States v. Haydel, 649
F.2d 1152, 1155 (stowing box under bed in parents' home), modified on other
grounds per curiam, 664 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
5. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Federal courts implement the objective portion of the test by evaluating some or all
of the following: 1) the ownership of the property; 2) the possession of the property;
3) the power of the individual to exclude others; 4) the legitimacy of the individual's
presence on the premises; 5) the historical and political reaction to certain intrusions;
and 6) the legislative opinion as expressed in a statute. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
153 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (factor 5); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606,
623 n.17 (1977) (factor 6); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 416 (1976) (same);
United States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960, 965 (1st Cir. 1982) (factors 1, 2, 3 and 4);
Nixon v. Freeman, 670 F.2d 346, 354 (D.C. Cir.) (factor 5), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
445 (1982); Blair v. United States, 665 F.2d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1981) (factor 6);
United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1155 (factors 2, 3 and 4), modified on other
grounds per curiam, 664 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982);
United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 370 (3d Cir. 1981) (factor 6).
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If either question is answered in the negative, the challenged action
is not a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment, 6 and
the procedural7 and substantive8 protections afforded by that amend-
ment will generally not apply.9 If both answers are in the affirmative,
6. J. Hall, supra note 2, § 1:6, at 10. For example, the following actions have
been found not to be searches protected by the fourth amendment: 1) the canine
search of school children and their belongings, Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 93 (7th
Cir. 1980) (Swygert, J., dissenting) ("I am deeply troubled by this court's holding
that the dragnet inspection. . . did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment."), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981); but see Horton v. Goose Creek Indep.
School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 473 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (canine sniff search of
school children unconstitutional but search of belongings permissible), petition for
cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3686 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1983) (No. 82-1510); 2) canine searches
of personal luggage at airports, United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 13 (4th Cir.
1980) (dog sniffing luggage cannot be considered a search within the protection of the
fourth amendment), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981); United States v. Bronstein,
521 F.2d 459, 461-62 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976); 3) the use of
an electronic beeper in an airplane to monitor its travel, United States v. Parks, 684
F.2d 1078, 1083-84 (5th Cir. 1982) (invasion of "no interest. .. the Fourth Amend-
ment was designed to protect"); United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489, 492 (9th
Cir.) ("not a search subject to fourth amendment"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1338
(1978); cf. United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081, 1087 (1983) (same, when beeper
placed in chloroform drum within automobile); 4) the search of commercial property
surrounded by "nothing more . . . than a barbed wire fence," United States v.
Rucinski, 658 F.2d 741, 746 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (no expectation of pri-
vacy), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982); 5) searches at established border check-
points, United States v. Harper, 617 F.2d 35, 37 (4th Cir.) ("fourth amendment's
protection . . . not implicated"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887 (1980); and 6) conversa-
tions intentionally overheard from an adjoining motel room, United States v. Aga-
pito, 620 F.2d 324, 329-32 (2d Cir.) (one cannot be sure who his neighbors are,
therefore no reasonable expectation of privacy), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980).
7. Procedural requirements include obtaining from a neutral and detached
magistrate, United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948), a warrant that particularly describes the place to be
searched and the things to be seized, Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-80
(1976); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 471 (1971) (plurality opinion),
and that is based upon probable cause, Agnilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 113-14
(1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963). See generally J. Hall,
supra note 2, §§ 6:1-:14, at 177-91; 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on
the Fourth Amendment § 3.1(a), at 438-39 (1978). See infra note 10 and accompany-
ing text.
8. Substantive protections include the exclusionary rule, which bars the use of
evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 648-49 (1961); see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). The rule
has been applied in federal courts since 1914, id., and in state courts since 1961.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). An alternate protection is to allow a private
cause of action and recovery of money damages to redress violations of the fourth
amendment. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
9. See supra note 6 and cases cited therein. The manner in which the search is
conducted must not offend due process for if it does, a conviction based on evidence
so obtained will be invalidated. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
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however, the court must then examine the challenged search in the
context of the fourth amendment's requirements.' 0 A search under-
taken without a warrant is presumed to be in violation of the fourth
amendment," "subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions." 12
The Court in Katz recognized that "the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects people, not places,"' 3 although, as Justice Harlan noted, the
application of the test "requires reference to a 'place.' "14 In recent
years, courts have defined a number of places as affording a person,
objectively, a diminished expectation of privacy. Such places include a
prison cell,' 5 a public school locker' 6 and an automobile. 17 Neverthe-
10. If a warrant was obtained, the court decides whether the probable cause and
specificity requirements were satisfied, see, e.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S.
573, 577 (1971) (plurality opinion) (probable cause); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367
U.S. 717, 732 (1961) (specificity); United States v. Hubbard, 493 F. Supp. 209, 217-
18, 221-28 (D.D.C. 1979) (probable cause and specificity), aff'd per curiam sub nom.
United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926
(1982), and whether the search was conducted in a reasonable manner, Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477 (1971) (plurality opinion) (disapproval of a
nighttime search); Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 586 (1968) (knock-and-
announce rule); Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c)(1) (fixing a time limit on the execution of a
warrant). If no warrant was secured, the court must determine whether the govern-
ment has shown that one of the well-established exceptions to the warrant require-
ment applies. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
11. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978); United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411, 427 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967); United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093, 1099 (5th Cir. 1982), petition for
cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3260 (U.S. Sept. 22, 1982) (No. 82-508); United States v.
Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 869 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 3493 (1982);
United States v. Haynie, 637 F.2d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
972 (1981).
12. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted). Govern-
ment agents may legally search without a warrant if: 1) the item is in plain view, that
is, the police are lawfully on the premises and they inadvertently discover something
the incriminating nature of which is immediately apparent, Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (plurality opinion); but see Texas v. Brown, 51
U.S.L.W. 4361, 4364-65 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1983) (plurality opinion) (officer needs only
probable cause to believe object discovered is incriminating); 2) the items are seized
incident to a lawful arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); 3)
there are exigent circumstances, such as hot pursuit or danger of imminent destruc-
tion of evidence, Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970); ALI Model Pre-Arraign-
ment Code § 260.5 (1975); or 4) the suspect has consented, Schneckloth v. Busta-
monte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). See generally Tenth Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1979-1980, 69 Geo.
L.J. 211, 233-49 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Procedure].
13. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
14. Id.
15. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 556-57 (1979); United States v. Chamorro, 687
F.2d 1, 2-4 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 462 (1982); Olson v. Klecker, 642 F.2d
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less, the Supreme Court has recognized that at times, the nature of the
object searched, not its location, controls the scope of the search.',
This Note contends that such recognition is acutely important when-
ever those objects are private papers, 19 which embody ideas and ex-
1115, 1116-17 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311,
1317 (7th Cir. 1975); see Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962) ("[A] jail
shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home.").
16. Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 473, 480-81 (5th
Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (ordinary fourth amendment requirements modified to deal
with special situation), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3686 (U.S. Mar. 10,
1983) (No. 82-1510); Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662, 670 (10th Cir. 1981) (fourth
amendment rights of students yield to school administrator's duty to promote the
public interest); Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1023 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (dimin-
ished expectations of privacy inherent in public schools), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
on other grounds per curiam, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1022 (1981).
17. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2164 (1982); South Dakota v. Opper-
man, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976); see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156
(1925).
18. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973); cf. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172
(1982) (scope of the warrantless search defined by the physical characteristics of the
object searched and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may
be found).
19. Private papers, as used in this Note, include writings that reflect personal
thoughts, plans and memories and are meant-at least when written-only for the
author's eyes. The term also includes the modern equivalents of these writings, such
as tape recordings and videotapes. The essential characteristic shared by these items
is that they are manifestations of thought not meant to be revealed to any party at the
time they were composed. The most common examples of such documents are diaries
and notes. It is clear that diaries enjoy a premium protection from intrusion. Couch
v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 350 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Diaries ...
that record only their author's personal thoughts lie at the heart of our sense of
privacy."); United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 897 (2d Cir. 1969) ("[W]e shrink
from allowing a personal diary to be the object of a search."), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
984 (1971); United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342, 1362-63 (D.D.C. 1981)
(seizure of diary unreasonable invasion of privacy), affd per curiam, 672 F.2d 115
(D.C. Cir. 1982); see Nixon v. Freeman, 670 F.2d 346, 354 (D.C. Cir.) (privacy
interest in diary or other personal communications), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 445
(1982); Bradley, Constitutional Protectionfor Private Papers, 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 461, 480-81 (1981) (Diary, notes and tape recordings "are nothing less than the
record of one's own thinking and should be considered as private as the thoughts
themselves."); McKenna, The Constitutional Protection of Private Papers: The Role
of a Hierarchical Fourth Amendment, 53 Ind. L.J. 55, 55 n. 1 (1977) (private papers
are those that relate to private rights or interests recognized by the Supreme Court to
be fundamental); Note, The Rights of Criminal Defendants and the Subpoena Duces
Tecum: The Aftermath of Fisher v. United States, 95 Harv L. Rev. 683, 694 n.64
(1982) (Intimate communications like diaries and unmailed letters are "personal
papers.") [hereinafter cited as Aftermath]; Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and
Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90
Harv. L. Rev. 945, 988-89 (1977) (presumption of privacy attaches to one's diary); cf.
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pressions protected under the first amendment. 20 When, as in this
instance, the nature of the document itself is relevant, rather than the
place in which it is located, the objective portion of the Katz test must
incorporate this notion.
This Note first summarizes the status of the fourth amendment
reasonable expectation of privacy test and then discusses several ways
in which the scope of that expectation has been narrowed. The consti-
tutional status of personal papers is then examined, initially under the
fourth amendment, then under the first amendment and finally, un-
der the two amendments in tandem. This Note illustrates the practical
application of first amendment interests to the objective reasonable-
ness analysis in three contexts in which objective expectations of pri-
vacy are traditionally diminished, concluding that both current case
law and the underlying purposes of the first and fourth amendments
mandate consideration of these first amendment interests.
I. THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION AFFORDED BY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Defining the Scope
Until 1967, courts construed the fourth amendment as protecting
only tangible items and governing only those intrusions involving an
actual physical trespass into a protected area.2 ' Messages passing over
telephone wires, for example, were not within the protection of the
fourth amendment; the interception of such messages was not deemed
to be a search.22 The decision in Katz v. United States03 explicitly
expanded the coverage of the fourth amendment2 4 by rejecting the
notion that a constitutionally cognizable search required a physical
trespass.2 5
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 n.7 (1976) ("Special problems of privacy
... might be presented by subpoena of a personal diary.").
20. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 455-60 (1977)
(substantial privacy interests in an individual's private papers). Professor Taylor has
stated that diaries should be protected because "first amendment values ... apply
... to personal 'speaking documents' of the victim of the search, and abundantly
justify stringent limitation ... of their seizure by exercise of official authority." T.
Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 66 (1969).
21. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928), overruled, Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). An intermediate step towards the Katz
holding was taken in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), in which the
Court invalidated electronic surveillance without considering whether there was a
technical trespass. Id. at 511.
22. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928), overruled, Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
23. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
24. Id. at 352-53; 1 W. LaFave, supra note 7, § 2.1, at 229; see The Supreme
Court, 1967 Term, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 63, 187 (1968).
25. 389 U.S. at 352-53.
1983]
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In Katz, the FBI's placement of a wiretap on the outside of a public
telephone booth26 was held to be a search because it was an intrusion
into a reasonable expectation of privacy.27 Because the FBI had nei-
ther obtained a search warrant nor met the burden of showing that an
exception to the warrant requirement applied,2 8 the search was held
unconstitutional.2 9
After Katz, the threshold question in fourth amendment analysis is
whether the individual challenging the alleged search had a reason-
able expectation of privacy with respect to the place that was
searched.30 Decisions subsequent to Katz have incorporated Justice
Harlan's reference to a place and focused on this expectation of pri-
vacy. 3' Some of these courts have concluded that certain areas pre-
sumptively afford an individual an objectively diminished reasonable
expectation of privacy. 32
B. The Scope is Narrowed
The reasonable expectation of privacy test of Katz was adopted to
broaden the constitutional protection of individual liberty against
searches by the government.3 3 Recently, however, courts have moved
26. Id. at 348.
27. Id. at 359.
28. Id. at 356; see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969) (burden on
those seeking exemption to show the need for it); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543, 548 (1968) (burden on government to prove individual freely and voluntar-
ily consented to search); United States v. Kelly, 529 F.2d 1365, 1371 (8th Cir. 1976)
(burden on government to show applicability of a legitimate exception to the warrant
requirement); J. Hall, supra note 2, § 26:28, at 707 & n.18 (survey of federal and
state jurisdictions placing burden on government to justify warrantless search by
proving applicable exception).
29. 389 U.S. at 357-59.
30. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2171 (1982); Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 556-57 (1979); Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d
470, 480-81 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3686
(U.S. Mar. 10, 1983) (No. 82-1510); United States v. Bulman, 667 F.2d 1374, 1383
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 919 (1982); People v. Grainger, 117 Mich. App.
740, 748, 324 N.W.2d 762, 765 (1982) (per curiam).
32. E.g., United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2171 (1982) (vehicle); Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 556-57 (1979) (institutional confinement); see Horton v.
Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 480-81 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam)
(public school), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3686 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1983) (No.
82-1510).
33. United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 261 n.4 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc)
(Tate, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1981); see I W. LaFave, supra note
7, § 2.1, at 229; Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L.
Rev. 349, 385 (1974). See generally Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation
of Privacy Test, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 154, 174-75 (1977) (discussing general belief that
Katz expanded fourth amendment protection) [hereinafter cited as Reconsidering
Katz].
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towards constricting the protections of the fourth amendment by
reading the two clauses of the fourth amendment disjunctively, and
thus construing more narrowly the concept of a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. 34 If the two clauses of the fourth amendment are
interpreted as separate and distinct restrictions on the power of the
state, the scope of protection may be narrowed. 35 The first clause
establishes the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 36 The second clause, which is grammatically
disjunctive,37 states: "and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing




Although it has long been recognized that some searches require no
warrant to be reasonable, 39 courts have generally adhered strictly to
34. Additionally, the "automatic standing" rule established in Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled, United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 95
(1980), which had permitted defendants charged with crimes of which possession is
an element to challenge a search merely by showing they were "legitimately on [the]
premises," id. at 267, was weakened in the 1978 Supreme Court decision in Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). The Rakas Court shifted fourth amendment standing
analysis away from whether the defendant was "legitimately on the premises" to the
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. Id. at 142-43. The Court thus merged
the concept of standing with the underlying substantive fourth amendment rights.
Id. at 140. Because fourth amendment rights are personal and may not be vicariously
asserted, id., the Court explained its decision as more truly reflective of the answer to
whether the disputed search "infringed an interest . . . which the Fourth Amend-
ment was designed to protect." Id. The effect of Rakas, and the 1980 decision in
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980), which explicitly overruled the "auto-
matic standing" doctrine, was to narrow the scope of the fourth amendment itself by
reducing the class of individuals that can contest a search and seizure. See id. at 89-
95; Slobogin, Capacity to Contest a Search and Seizure: The Passing of Old Rules
and Some Suggestions for New Ones, 18 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 387, 388-89 (1981);
Reconsidering Katz, supra note 33, at 154 n.5.
35. McKenna, supra note 19, at 81-82; see J. Hall, supra note 2, § 1:3, at 7-8.
The Supreme Court has stated: "The Fourth Amendment does not denounce all
searches... but only such as are unreasonable." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 147 (1925); Reconsidering Katz, supra note 33, at 154 n.4.
36. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
37. Although modern texts show the clauses separated by a comma, 1 Stat. 21
(1789) uses a semi-colon. J. Hall, supra note 2, § 1:15, at 20.
38. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
39. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925); United States v. Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057, 1068 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991 (1982); United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d 1356,
1360 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 146 (1982); see United States v. 12 200-
Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886).
The results in the border search cases offer the clearest example of interpreting the
two clauses of the fourth amendment independently. Customs searches are per se
reasonable and thus not subject to the warrant provisions of the second clause of the
fourth amendment. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977). The searches
are, however, subject to the requirements of due process. See supra note 9.
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the warrant requirement, subject to the established exceptions. 40 If the
clauses of the amendment are interpreted independently, however, a
search warrant would not be a prerequisite to a valid search unless the
intrusion was first found to be unreasonable under the first clause. 4'
The disjunctive reading has resulted in the expansion of the cate-
gory of reasonable warrantless searches. Searches of prison cells and
their contents have been upheld, even though the exigent circum-
stances42 usually required to justify warrantless intrusions were not
present, because the intrusion was not considered objectively unrea-
sonable.43 Similarly, searches of public school lockers have been found
constitutional under the fourth amendment because the lockers afford
objectively diminished expectations of privacy. 44
The automobile exception to the warrant requirement has also been
expanded. 45 Although it was initially predicated upon an exigent cir-
40. E.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 394-95 (1978); United States v.
United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 309-10, 317-18 (1972); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925);
United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093, 1099 (5th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed,
51 U.S.L.W. 3260 (U.S. Sept. 22, 1982) (No. 82-508); United States v. Martino, 664
F.2d 860, 869 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 929 (1982); see Stelzner, The
Fourth Amendment: The Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses, 10 N.M.L. Rev. 33,
41-42 (1980). See supra note 12.
41. In certain instances, reasonableness, instead of being defined solely by refer-
ence to the warrant clause, is determined using a balancing test. Fourth amendment
reasonableness is thus not synonymous with the warrant requirement. Stelzner, supra
note 40, at 47-48.
42. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948); United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1318 (9th
Cir. 1982).
43. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 555-57 (1979); DiGuiseppe v. Ward, 698 F.2d
602, 605 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Ready, 574 F.2d 1009, 1014 (10th Cir.
1978).
44. Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662, 670 (10th Cir. 1981); In re W., 29 Cal.
App. 3d 777, 780, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775, 777 (1973); see Horton v. Goose Creek Indep.
School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 473 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), petition for cert. filed,
51 U.S.L.W. 3686 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1983) (No. 82-1510); cf. Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F.
Supp. 1012, 1022 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (canine sniff searches in hallways upheld as
reasonable), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds per curiam, 631 F.2d 91
(7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981); People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d
909, 912-13, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731, 736 (App. Term 1971) (the doctrine of in loco
parentis makes dispensing with probable cause reasonable in the school setting),
aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 734, 284 N.E.2d 153, 333 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1972). See generally
Comment, Search and Seizure in Public Schools: Are Our Children's Rights Going to
the Dogs?, 24 St. Louis U.L.J. 119, 124 (1979) (noting that school searches fall into
none of traditional exceptions to warrant requirement, yet are permitted).
45. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct.
2157 (1982), warrantless searches of movable containers located within an automo-
bile were unconstitutional, though the vehicle itself was the subject of a well-
established exception to the warrant requirement. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S.
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cumstance-the inherent mobility of the automobile 46-more recently
courts have justified the exception by stating that an automobile
affords its owner or operator a diminished expectation of privacy. 47
For example, in United States v. Ross, 48 the Court established that
because of the lesser expectation of privacy one enjoys in an automo-
bile, the permissible scope of a warrantless search therein was to be
guided "by the object of the search and the places in which there is
probable cause to believe it may be found. ' 49
In determining whether an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy exists, courts balance the interest of the government in accu-
rate, efficient and safe law enforcement against the interest of the
individual in privacy, security and dignity.50 Decisions that have nar-
rowed the contours of a reasonable expectation of privacy have tended
to look only to the individual's privacy interest in the place of the
search, and have overlooked the privacy interest in the object itself.
II. PERSONAL PAPERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
A. Personal Papers and the Fourth Amendment
Prior to the enunciation of the Katz reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy test, private papers occupied a discrete, constitutionally pro-
420, 423, 428 (1981) (plurality opinion), overruled, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct.
2157, 2172 (1982); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 757, 763 (1979), overruled,
United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1982); United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 12 (1977). After Ross, both the vehicle and its contents are permissible areas
for a warrantless search. 102 S. Ct. at 2172.
46. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
47. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976) ("[T]he expectation of
privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's
home or office."); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion)
("One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is
transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal
effects."); United States v. Garza-Hernandez, 623 F.2d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1980)
("[T]he reasonable expectation of privacy that persons may have in their autos is
usually of a lesser magnitude than privacy expectations that inhere in other types of
property."); see J. Hall, supra note 2, § 9:8, at 281 ("Because of the peripatetic
nature of automobiles ... and the fact the interior is commonly subject to view...
the Supreme Court has held that owners and operators of automobiles have a lesser
expectation of privacy in them.").
48. 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
49. Id. at 2172; accord United States v. Rivera, 684 F.2d 308, 310 (5th Cir.
1982).
50. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 51 U.S.L.W. 4361, 4364 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1983)
(plurality opinion); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555
(1976); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-27 (1968); United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d
115, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam); United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44, 48 (2d




tected area under the fourth amendment. 51 The Supreme Court con-
tinued to recognize the validity of this special protection after Katz. In
United States v. Miller,52 the Court validated, over the petitioner's
fourth amendment claim of privacy, a subpoena directed toward the
production of financial records held by a bank.53 After examining the
nature of the documents, the Court was unable to perceive a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the contents 54 because the documents
were not "confidential communications." 55 Implicit in the Court's
analysis in Miller is that if the documents had in fact been private
papers, they would not have been subject to production, notwith-
standing the petitioner's lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the place in which the papers were kept.
51. Prior to Katz, the privacy interests involved in private papers were given
special consideration under a rationale outlined in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 622-23 (1886). This special protection afforded private papers was embodied in
the "mere evidence" rule. See Couled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 312 (1921),
overruled, Warden, Md. Pen. v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304-06 (1967). The rule
forbade seizure of any private papers that were mere evidence and not the instrumen-
tality of a crime. Id. at 309-10.
Although the Supreme Court has examined the nature of the documents demanded
in determining the validity of a subpoena, United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442
(1976), later cases focus on the reasonable expectation of privacy in the place
searched, rather than whether there is an intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 556-57 (1979); DiGuiseppe v. Ward, 698
F.2d 602, 605 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d 1107, 1108 (9th
Cir. 1972) (per curiam), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973). But see United States v.
Vallez, 653 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir.) (court recognized that prisoners have a reason-
able expectation of privacy in a sealed letter but justified warrantless search of letter
because guard suspected it may contain escape plans), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 904
(1981).
The Supreme Court discarded the "mere evidence" rule in 1967, Warden, Md.
Pen. v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1967), thus enlarging the area of permissible
searches. In doing so, the Court cautioned that "the intrusions are nevertheless [to be]
made after fulfilling the probable cause and particularity requirements of the Fourth
Amendment and after the intervention of 'a neutral and detached magistrate. .... ""
Id. at 309-10 (qdoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). The Court
thus reiterated the concept that the presence of probable cause is insufficient to
validate a search; a neutral magistrate must issue a warrant in the absence of a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement.
52. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
53. Id. at 437. The Court had previously held, in California Banker's Ass'n v.
Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), "that the mere maintenance of the records [pursuant to
statutory requirements] invade[s] no Fourth Amendment right. ... Id. at 54. The
respondent in Miller argued, however, that the combination of the statutory record-
keeping requirements and the issuance of a subpoena permitted the government to
circumvent the fourth amendment. 425 U.S. at 441.
54. 425 U.S. at 442.
55. Id.
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Many courts, however, have not analyzed the nature of the object
searched but have instead focused solely on the place. 56 This analysis
sufficiently protects private papers when the place searched is ac-
corded the full protection of the fourth amendment.5 7 Nevertheless,
when reasonable expectations of privacy in the place are diminished,
the proper analysis must include examination of the particular object
of the search in order to give substance to the Supreme Court's long-
standing protection of private papers under the fourth amendment. In
Rakas v. Illinois,5 s the Supreme Court recognized that an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy must have a source outside the
fourth amendment.5 9 When the object of a search is private papers,
that source is the first amendment.
B. Private Papers and the First Amendment
Society's concern for first amendment guarantees is embodied in the
"preferred position" 60 these guarantees are afforded in the hierarchy
of individual rights. For example, speech may not be subjected to a
prior restraint unless it clearly and immediately endangers national
security.61 When the government seeks to silence a speaker or author,
56. DiGuiseppe v. Ward, 698 F.2d 602, 605 (2d Cir. 1983); see Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 556-57 (1979); United States v. Chamorro, 687 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 462 (1982).
57. A search of an individual's house for personal papers, for example, requires a
warrant because an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his house.
See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766-77 (1969); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S.
139, 142-43 (1962); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948); Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925); United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 331
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980); cf. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S.
547, 565 (1978) ("[T]he preconditions for a warrant-probable cause, specificity
with respect to the place to be searched . . .and overall reasonableness-should
afford sufficient protection against the harms that are assertedly threatened by
warrants for searching newspaper offices.").
58. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
59. Id. at 144 n.12; see United States v. Jacobson, 647 F.2d 990, 993-94 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); United States v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110, 114
(2d Cir. 1980).
60. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949) (plurality opinion); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943); J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Hand-
book on Constitutional Law 718-20 (1978); see Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 527
n. 12 (1945).
61. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971) (Brennan,
J., concurring) ("[O]nly . . .proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and
immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a
transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim restraining
order."); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (suggesting a military security
exception to the general prohibition against prior restraints).
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it bears the heavy burden62 of showing that the "substantive evil" is
extremely serious and that the "degree of imminence" is extremely
high.6 3
The first amendment also protects freedom of thought.64 To make
this protection more than a mere facade, personal papers must also
enjoy the protections of the first amendment:6 5 "[I]ndividuals [must]
have some sanctuary where private reflections and inspirations may
be created or recorded without fear that the state will broadcast
them."' 66 Even the threat of disclosure of thoughts expressed in private
papers may have a chilling effect on their author, and may inhibit
cautious thinkers. 67 As one commentator has noted: "If unpopular
statements on subjects like politics and religion are omitted from
personal papers out of fear that the government may eventually see
62. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) ("barriers to prior
restraint [are] high"); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714
(1971) (per curiam) (" 'Any system of prior restraints ...[bears] a heavy presump-
tion against its constitutional validity.' ") (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
63. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978).
Although the Supreme Court discredited in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969) (per curiam), the mechanistic application of the clear and present danger test
first articulated by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919), courts subsequent to Brandenburg continue to employ the clear and present
danger test. E.g., Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996, 1003 (7th Cir. 1982); Kirksey v.
City of Jackson, 663 F.2d 659, 661-62 (5th Cir. 1981); Wilkinson v. Skinner, 462
F.2d 670, 672-73 (2d Cir. 1972).
64. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (state has no right to control a
person's thoughts). Writing for the Stanley Court, Justice Marshall relied in part, id.
at 564, on Justice Brandeis' famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928), overruled, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1969): "The makers
of our Constitution . . .sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred ... the right to be let alone .... "
Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis' position was adopted by the
Court in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
65. Control over who will have knowledge concerning an individual's life is a
basic part of the right to shape the self that one presents to the world. L. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law 966 (1978). Certain techniques of information gather-
ing offend the first and fourth amendments. Id.; see Aftermath, supra note 19, at
699-700. Thus, while one court has found it contradictory to invoke the first amend-
ment to protect thoughts that were never meant to reach the public forum, Di-
Guiseppe v. Ward, 698 F.2d 602, 605 (2d Cir. 1983), the intimate nature of private
papers requires that they be afforded increased protection. Aftermath, supra note 19,
at 699-700.
66. Aftermath, supra note 19, at 699 (footnote omitted).
67. See id. at 696; Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 420 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("The ability to think private thoughts, facilitated as it is by pen and
paper, and the ability to preserve intimate memories would be curtailed through fear
that those thoughts or the events of those memories would become the subjects of
criminal sanctions ....").
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them, the values served by the first amendment are unquestionably
eroded." 68 Because of the preferred position accorded first amend-
ment guarantees, the protections afforded by that amendment must
not be overlooked when a search is conducted in a place governed by
diminished objectively reasonable expectations of privacy. Neverthe-
less, some courts have presumed that the protections afforded by the
two amendments are always coextensive.
C. The Coextensivity Doctrine
When the full scope of fourth amendment protection applies, as in a
search of an individual's home, the protective zone of privacy afforded
by the first amendment is coextensive with that provided by the
fourth. 69 In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,70 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that a search of a newspaper's files pursuant to a
warrant had a chilling effect on the freedom guaranteed to the press
by the first amendment. 1 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the Constitution requires only that when first amendment values are
at stake, courts apply the warrant requirement with "scrupulous exac-
titude."72 According to Zurcher, the prior judicial scrutiny required
by the fourth amendment sufficiently protects first amendment inter-
ests. 7
3
Unfortunately, Zurcher has been extended to situations in which
the fourth amendment does not mandate prior judicial approval of
searches. In Reporters Committee v. American Telephone and Tele-
graph Co.,74 Circuit Judge Wilkey, relying on Zurcher, stated that
first amendment protections were no greater than those afforded by
the fourth amendment, even in situations in which the fourth amend-
ment warrant requirement did not apply. 75
68. Aftermath, supra note 19, at 696 (footnote omitted).
69. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
70. 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), aff'g per curiam 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal.
1972), rev'd, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
71. Id. at 464.
72. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978) (quoting Stanford v.
Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965)).
73. Id.; id. at 570 (Powell, J., concurring). The Court suggested that if an extra
degree of protection was desirable, the legislature was free to provide such special
protection. Id. at 567. Congress did, in fact, provide this additional protection, in the
form of the Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (Supp. IV 1980).
74. 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979).
75. Id. at 1054-60. The fourth amendment did not apply in Reporters Commit-
tee because the plaintiff journalists had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
business records held by a third party. Id. at 1043-44; see United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976). Judge Wilkey characterized the plaintiffs' contention as whether
journalists enjoy a greater zone of first amendment privacy than other citizens. He
concluded that they did not. 593 F.2d at 1054. But see id. (first amendment may give
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Circuit Judge Robinson, who concurred in part, disagreed with
Judge Wilkey's analysis of the interplay of the two amendments. 76
Judge Robinson recognized that "the analysis appropriate for First
Amendment issues concentrates on the burden inflicted on protected
activities, and the result may not always coincide with that attained
by application of Fourth Amendment doctrine. '7 7 Similarly, the dis-
senting opinion pointed out that Judge Wilkey's reliance on Zurcher
was misplaced, because Zurcher turned explicitly on the determina-
tion that the prior judicial approval was sufficiently protective, and
not on the principle that first amendment rights, like fourth amend-
ment rights, fluctuated depending upon the level of intrusion. 78 Thus
the magnitude of the burden on first amendment rights must be
balanced against the legitimate interests of the government.79
The Supreme Court has repeatedly and clearly indicated that first
amendment protections do not shrink commensurately with those of
the fourth amendment. s0 Prisoners, for example, have substantial first
amendment rights"' but their fourth amendment rights are severely
diminished in scope.8 2 Similarly, while a public school must operate
within the confines of the first amendment,8 3 at least one lower court,
although not yet the Supreme Court, has recognized that full fourth
amendment protections do not apply in the school environment.8 4
rise to some privacy-type interests apart from those secured by the fourth amend-
ment).
76. Id. at 1071 n.4 (Robinson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1080 (Wright, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 1089-90 (Wright, J., dissenting).
80. Competing interests under both the first and fourth amendments are deter-
mined with a balancing of interests test, but the relative weight of the factors
balanced is determined differently under each. In the fourth amendment area, the
touchstone is reasonableness. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 27 (1968); Criminal Procedure, supra note 12, at 217.
The first amendment however, requires a more stringent test; the government has
"the burden of either coming within one of the narrow categorical exceptions [to the
first amendment] or showing that the regulation is necessary to further a 'compelling
state interest.' "L. Tribe, supra note 65, at 602; see Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
530 (1945) (rational connection between legislation and substantive evil is insuffi-
cient); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1941) (same).
81. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974); Simmat v. Manson, 554 F.
Supp. 1363, 1374-75 (D. Conn. 1983).
82. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 556-57 (1979).
83. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2813 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring) ("beyond dispute that schools ... must operate within the confines of the First
Amendment"); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969) (Students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.").
84. Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1020 (N.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds per curiam, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 1022 (1981).
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By blindly adhering to the assumption that fourth amendment
procedural requirements always protect substantive first amendment
interests, 85 courts overlook the situation in which fourth amendment
procedural safeguards are not present because substantive fourth
amendment rights are diminished. In the context of private papers,
recognizing the distinct interests attached to the papers as opposed to
the interests in the place in which the papers are kept is particularly
important.
III. REFOCUSING FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
A. Recognizing First Amendment Interests
Distinctions have been made between the reasonableness of the
fourth amendment expectation of privacy in a particular place and
the first amendment right to privacy that attaches to a tangible object
within that area. 8 Two recent cases illustrate the disparate results
achieved when the place, rather than the object therein, has been the
focus of the court's analysis.
In DiGuiseppe v. Ward,8 7 the district court found a constitutional
violation when a prison guard seized and read the plaintiffs diary
during a security check two days after a riot. 8 The court found that
the prisoner retained a modicum of fourth amendment rights in prison
and that "prisoners both have and should have ... an expectation [of
privacy] in the contents of a personal diary. "89
The court evidently recognized the first amendment values impli-
cated by the seizure and reading of the prisoner's diary. The issue was
85. The district court in Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Mich. 1979),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1982),
applied Judge Wilkey's reasoning from Reporters Committee, id. at 570-72; see
Reporters Comm. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1053-71 (D.C. Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979), without recognizing the logical fallacy of
concluding that Zurcher's holding-if the fourth amendment applies the first amend-
ment applies coextensively, see Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978)-also
means that if the fourth amendment offers no protection, neither does the first
amendment. See W. Gustason & D. Ulrich, Elementary Symbolic Logic 57 (1973)
(discussing the logical fallacy of denying the antecedent).
86. United States v. Rabinowitz, 176 F.2d 732, 735 (2d Cir. 1949), rev'd, 339
U.S. 56 (1950). In his opinion for the Second Circuit, Judge Hand stated that
although a privacy interest in a place has been lost, that interest is "altogether
separate from the interest in protecting ... papers from indiscriminate rummage,
even though both are customarily grouped together as parts of the 'right of privacy.' "
Id. Judge Hand's view was ultimately vindicated in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969), in which the Supreme Court specifically disapproved its decision in
Rabinowitz. Id. at 768 (overruling United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950)).
The Court subsequently relied on Judge Hand's statement for its holding in Walter v.
United States, 447 U.S. 649, 659 n.13 (1980) (plurality opinion).
87. 514 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 698 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1983).
88. Id. at 503-04.
89. Id. at 505.
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briefed by both sides in the memoranda submitted to the court 0 and
the court evaluated the state's actions under the first amendment
doctrine of clear and present danger. 91 Thus, by focusing on both the
nature of the prison surroundings and the object of the search, the
district court was able to protect the prisoner's fundamental first
amendment privacy interests.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, finding the
clear and present danger standard inapposite to the case.92 Applying
the Katz two-part test, the court rejected arguments that the search
implicated first amendment interests, 93 instead holding the search
reasonable under the diminished fourth amendment rules applicable
in the prison context.9 4 By focusing on the place searched and disre-
garding the object therein, a less protective result than that of the
district court was reached.
In contrast is Walter v. United States, 5 in which the Supreme
Court recognized and accorded primacy to the presence of first
amendment interests in the context of a fourth amendment search. In
Walter, FBI agents lawfully acquired possession of a dozen cartons of
motion pictures and then viewed these films without first obtaining a
90. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at
2-3, DiGuiseppe v. Ward, 514 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (relying on Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)), rev'd, 698 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1983): Defendant's
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 7-10, DiGuiseppe v.
Ward, 514 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (relying in part on Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539 (1974) and Morgan v. Montanye, 516 F.2d 1367 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976)), revd, 698 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1983).
The Morgan court's opinion was framed in terms of the sixth amendment right to
counsel, 516 F.2d at 1372, and therefore does not speak to any possible 'privilege' a
diary may enjoy under the first amendment. Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
565-66 (1969) (controlling content of person's thoughts is wholly inconsistent with the
first amendment). The Supreme Court, in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)
stated that the opening of a prisoner's incoming mail in the presence of the inmate
would not constitute censorship in violation of the first amendment unless the mail
was to be read as well. See id. at 577. Thus, contrary to the government defendants'
assertion in DiGuiseppe, the inference may be drawn that the actual reading of mail
may indeed impinge on the first amendment.
91. DiGuiseppe v. Ward, 514 F. Supp. 503, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (further search
proper only if it was reasonable to expect that diary contained information concern-
ing imminent danger), rev'd, 698 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1983).
92. DiGuiseppe v. Ward, 698 F.2d 602, 605 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'g 514 F. Supp.
503 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
93. See id. at 605.
94. Id. at 605. The DiGuiseppe court applied Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 556-
57 (1979) to determine the reasonableness of the search. 698 F.2d at 605. Bell used
the reasonable expectation of privacy test and determined that any reasonable expec-
tation of privacy retained would necessarily be of a diminished scope in the prison
environment. 441 U.S. at 557.
95. 447 U.S. 649 (1980) (plurality opinion).
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warrant.9 6 Reversing the defendants' conviction on obscenity charges,
the Court held the warrantless screening of the films to be a violation
of their fourth amendment rights. 9
7
Although nongovernment parties opened the containers without
viewing the film, thereby partially frustrating the defendants' expec-
tation of privacy, the defendants' expectation of privacy in the films
was not defeated."8 The authority of an officer to possess a package is
distinct from his authority to examine its contents, which derives only
from a search warrant or an exception thereto. The Walter Court
stated that "[w]hen the contents of the package are . . . arguably
protected by the First Amendment ... it is especially important that
this requirement be scrupulously observed." 99
B. First Amendment Protections As a Factor
in Objective Reasonableness
Under the test employed subsequent to Katz v. United States,100 an
individual must first have manifested a subjective expectation that the
private paper searched would remain confidential and must have
acted in accordance with this belief. 10' It is tautological to state that
an individual has a subjective expectation of privacy in a diary or
personal notes.10 2 The expectation of privacy manifested must also be
objectively reasonable; one that society is prepared to recognize.10 3
The preferred status of the first amendment in the hierarchy of per-
sonal rights10 4 clearly indicates such a recognition. 0 5
96. Id. at 651 (plurality opinion). The cartons in which the films were packed
had been opened by a private party, but that party did not view the films. Id. at 656
(plurality opinion). Furthermore, the labels on the film boxes gave them probable
cause to believe that the films were obscene. Id. at 654 (plurality opinion).
97. Id. at 654 (plurality opinion) (reversing United States v. Sanders, 592 F.2d
788 (5th Cir. 1979)).
98. Id. at 658-59 (plurality opinion); accord United States v. Haes, 551 F.2d 767,
771 (8th Cir. 1977); see United States v. Barry, 673 F.2d 912, 920 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 238 (1982).
99. 447 U.S. at 655 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted); accord Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978).
100. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
101. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
102. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 350 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); Nixon v. Freeman, 670 F.2d 346; 354 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 445
(1982); United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342, 1362-63 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd
per curiam, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Society would likely feel differently if the
cover page of the diary bore the title "Robberies I Have Performed." United States v.
Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 897 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971).
103. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
104. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943); J. Nowak, R. Rotunda
& J. Young, supra note 60, at 718-19.
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In places presently regarded as affording a diminished expectation
of privacy, objects protected by the first amendment, such as personal
papers, must be analyzed separately. 10 6 Such analysis is in accord with
that employed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Miller,10 7 in
which the Court considered the alleged confidentiality of the docu-
ments searched in determining the protections to be afforded them. 10
Under the proper fourth amendment analysis in the context of such
a diminished expectation, the court must ascertain whether the object
searched in that place is protected by the first amendment. 09 If a first
amendment expectation of privacy exists, the fourth amendment's
warrant requirement applies, even if a warrant would not otherwise
be required to search the place in which the object is located. Addi-
105. Additional factors in the reasonable expectation of privacy test include: 1) a
common-law property interest, United States v. Briones-Garza, 680 F.2d 417, 420
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 229 (1982); United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d
1152, 1154-55, modified on other grounds per curiam, 664 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982); 2) the power to exclude others, Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 149 (1978); and 3) possession of the area searched or the property
seized, United States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960, 965 (1st Cir. 1982).
106. The presence of first amendment interests "calls for a higher hurdle in the
evaluation of reasonableness." Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973); see
United States v. Kelly, 529 F.2d 1365, 1372 (8th Cir. 1976) ("The Fourth Amend-
ment should be read in conjunction with the First Amendment, rather than 'in a
vacuum.' ") (quoting Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 501 (1973)). Furthermore,
"[I]ogically, a person's protectable expectation of privacy must extend both to places
and objects." Id. at 1369 (emphasis in original).
McKenna discusses the need in fourth amendment analysis for a more protective
standard and a hierarchical view, which he describes as "content-based." McKenna,
supra note 19, at 71. The author calls for a higher standard of probable cause. Id. at
73-76. This Note, however, recognizes that some intrusions do not require probable
cause to be legal and therefore the first amendment element must be introduced into
the inquiry at an earlier stage. McKenna realizes the importance of this result, id. at
81-84, but his proposal to ameliorate the problems was formulated prior to the
Supreme Court's reversal of the Ninth Circuit in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S.
547 (1978), and therefore his reliance on the Ninth Circuit's holding, McKenna,
supra note 19, at 71, 83, is misplaced.
107. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
108. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
109. This is not to say, however, that the court should focus exclusively on the
nature of the item. Rather, the nature of the item should be examined in conjunction
with an examination of the expectations of privacy in the place within which the item
is located. Focusing exclusively on the nature of the item may, in fact, limit the
protection of the fourth amendment rather than enlarge it, for an individual cannot
be said to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband. United States v.
Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 890 (1976), overruled on other grounds per curiam, United
States v. Miller, 636 F.2d 850, 854 (1st Cir. 1980). The conclusion then would be that
all searches for illegal substances are not within the fourth amendment. United States
v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1320 n.9 (9th Cir. 1982).
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tionally, all of the exceptions to the warrant requirement 10 other than
that of plain view, apply.
The plain view exception to the warrant requirement, which per-
mits police who are legitimately on the premises,"' and who inadver-
tently discover an object," 2 the incriminating nature of which is
immediately apparent," 3 to seize it without first obtaining a war-
rant,11 will seldom apply. The incriminating nature of private papers
will not be immediately apparent to officers without their first being
read." 5 The reading of papers, as opposed to the mere seizing of them,
is identical to the activity of viewing films without a warrant, a
practice held unconstitutional in Walter v. United States." 6
If the police establish that the papers are in imminent danger of
destruction they may hold them, without reading them, until a war-
rant is obtained. The only conceivable imminent danger that would
justify a warrantless reading of them 1 7 would be the reasonable belief
of the police that the papers contained information relevant to an
ongoing or future crime."8 The issuance of the warrant must be based
110. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
111. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (plurality opinion);
Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (per curiam). A police officer may
be legitimately on the premises if he has a warrant for another object, is in hot
pursuit, or is searching incident to a lawful arrest. J. Hall, supra note 2, § 3:13, at 68;
id. § 3:12, at 66.
112. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469 (1971) (plurality opinion); J.
Hall, supra note 2, § 3:13, at 68.
113. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (plurality opinion); J.
Hall, supra note 2, § 3:14, at 69.
The Supreme Court recently relaxed the seemingly strict standard of Coolidge,
stating in a plurality opinion that "immediately apparent" should not "be taken to
imply that an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminatory character of
evidence is necessary for an application of the 'plain view' doctrine." Texas v. Brown,
51 U.S.L.W. 4361, 4364 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1983) (plurality opinion). Probable cause to
associate the item viewed with criminal activity is sufficient for a warrantless search.
Id. at 4365 (plurality opinion).
114. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466-71 (1971) (plurality opin-
ion); J. Hall, supra note 2, §§ 3:9-:14, at 62-69.
115. Cf. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 653-54 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(viewing film); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 571 (1969) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring) (same).
116. 447 U.S. 649, 654 (1980) (plurality opinion).
117. Generally, the emergency exception to the warrant requirement is applied
when a suspect is fleeing or likely to take flight, the search is of a movable vehicle or
the contraband is threatened with removal or destruction. Vale v. Louisiana, 399
U.S. 30, 34-35 (1970); Warden, Md. Pen. v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967);
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1951); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 14-15 (1948).
118. See People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 736-39, 497 P.2d 1121, 1139-41, 102
Cal. Rptr. 385, 403-05 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973).
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upon the knowledge the police had prior to the seizure, not based
upon information acquired in the course of reading them."19
Moreover, the Supreme Court has suggested that the plain view
doctrine will not support the seizure of materials presumptively enti-
tled to first amendment protection. 120 Lower courts have clearly re-
jected the plain view exception in first amendment contexts.'12 This
view is in accord with the Supreme Court's decision in Roaden v.
Kentucky, 122 in which the Court recognized that fourth amendment
doctrines applicable to one type of material may be unreasonable in
another setting. 123
C. Applying the First Amendment Factor in the
Objective Reasonableness Test
First amendment interests must be most carefully safeguarded
when objects are located in places in which fourth amendment protec-
tions are diminished. Three such settings are the prison, 24 the public
school 12 5 and the automobile. 126
The Supreme Court has recognized that a prisoner's first amend-
ment rights, though necessarily restricted by penological require-
ments, do not stop at the prison gate. 127 A prisoner's fourth amend-
119. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 492-93 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968); McKenna, supra note 19, at 79 n.124;
see McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 304 (1967).
120. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 & n.5 (1979). Because the
material portions of the document will not become apparent until and unless the
private paper is read, allowing the plain view exception to govern in this context
violates the proscription against the general search warrant. Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 571-72 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476,
480 (1965); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); Comment, "Plain
View"-Anything But Plain: Coolidge Divides the Lower Courts, 7 Loy. L.A.L.
Rev. 489, 500-02 (1974).
121. United States v. Sherwin, 572 F.2d 196, 199 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
437 U.S. 909 (1978); United States v. Kelly, 529 F.2d 1365, 1372 (8th Cir. 1976);
accord Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., 350 So. 2d 158, 165 (La. 1977); cf.
United States v. Underwood, 693 F.2d 1306, 1314 n.26 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The
Supreme Court has recognized only one exception to the search warrant requirement
for nonconsensual law enforcement entries into private residences, and that is when
exigent circumstances justify an entry.").
122. 413 U.S. 496 (1973).
123. Id. at 501.
124. See supra note 15.
125. See supra note 16.
126. See supra note 17.
127. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 822 (1974); see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 422 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
concurring). In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119
(1977), the Court states that major restrictions may be imposed when first amend-
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ment rights, however, are diminished because he has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his jail cell. 128 The treatment accorded first
amendment interests by the district court in DiGuiseppe both prop-
erly protected the prisoner's interests 129 and furthered the interest of
society in rehabilitating inmates. 130 This dichotomy should be incor-
porated into any determination of the objective reasonableness of a
prisoner's expectation of privacy in his personal papers.
Similarly, although a public school student has no objectively rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in his locker,13 1 the first amendment
rights of students do not stop at the schoolhouse gate. 132 A court
considering the legality of a locker search involving an examination of
private papers must use the first amendment as a factor in determin-
ing the objective reasonableness of an expectation of privacy in those
papers. This focus on the object searched, in addition to the place,
would give substance to the often-quoted phrase that schools are
"educating the young for citizenship [and must scrupulously protect
the] Constitutional freedoms of the individual ...and teach youth
[not] to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes." '33 Because there is no well-established, specific exception
ment values are at stake, id. at 129-30, but goes on to note that restrictions on
associational rights do not implicate free speech, id. at 131. Any such restriction
remains judicially reviewable and the determination of reasonableness rests ulti-
mately with the courts. Barrett v. Virginia, 689 F.2d 498, 502 (4th Cir. 1982).
128. Olson v. Klecker, 642 F.2d 1115, 1116 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (minimal
fourth amendment protection); United States v. Ready, 574 F.2d 1009, 1013-14 (10th
Cir. 1978) (same); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1316 (7th Cir. 1975) (same);
United States v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1371, 1372-73 (9th Cir. 1973) (same), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 932 (1974); United States v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d 1107, 1108 (9th Cir. 1972)
(per curiam) (objectively unreasonable for prisoner to consider his cell private), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973); see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 556-57 (1979)
("[G]iven the realities of institutional confinement, any reasonable expectation of
privacy . . . necessarily would be of a diminished scope.").
129. 514 F. Supp. 503, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 698 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1983);
accord People v. Williams, 118 Mich. App. 117, 122, 325 N.W.2d 4, 7 (1982).
130. Singer, Privacy, Autonomy, and Dignity in the Prison: A Preliminary In-
quiry Concerning Constitutional Aspects of the Degradation Process in Our Prisons,
21 Buffalo L. Rev. 669, 715 (1972); see Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 5 n.2
(1978) (plurality opinion) ("Inmates in jails ... retain certain fundamental rights of
privacy; they are not like animals in a zoo .... ).
131. See Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 480-81 (5th
Cir. 1982) (per curiam), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3686 (U.S. Mar. 10,
1983) (No. 82-1510); Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662, 670 (10th Cir. 1981); Doe v.
Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1023 (N.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds per curiam, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022
(1981).
132. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2807 (1982) (plurality opinion);
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
133. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943); see, e.g.,
Board of Educ. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2807 (1982) (plurality opinion); Tinker v.
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to the warrant requirement for schools,134 once courts recognize that a
student has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the
diary within his locker, school authorities will almost always need a
warrant to search a diary found therein.1 35 This would change the
minimum standard for this intrusion from the reasonable suspicion
standard that now governs to one of probable cause. 13
6
In the context of an automobile search, probable cause is currently
required for a warrantless search of a car and its contents. 137 If the
police are legitimately searching a car and inadvertently discover a
diary, they would, arguably, be permitted under current law to read
it because of the diminished expectation of privacy afforded by a
car. 38 If, however, the court looks beyond the place searched to the
object, and incorporates the first amendment as a factor in its analy-
sis, a warrant would be required before the police read the diary.
Fourth amendment protections for private papers based on first
amendment interests will not unduly burden law enforcement ef-
Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969); Horton v.
Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 481 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838, 845 n.8 (2d Cir. 1977).
134. In Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982)
(per curiam), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3686 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1983) (No.
82-1510), the court added the school setting to the exigent circumstances exception to
the warrant requirement, stating: "If the school does have reasonable cause to
suspect the presence of contraband, the ease with which it can be destroyed or moved
presents an exigent circumstance that excuses the warrant requirement." Id. at 482
(citation omitted). The actual exigency of the circumstance must be examined criti-
cally. The contraband at issue in Horton was narcotics. When the police are search-
ing for narcotics in a private residence, a warrant is a prerequisite, Steagald v.
United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211 (1981), absent an applicable exception. Drugs
located in such a residence, however, may be destroyed or moved as quickly as those
in the lockers in the high school in Goose Creek. The finding of exigency may then be
a pretext for creating another exception to the warrant requirement for school
searches. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
135. Requiring an officer to go before a magistrate to obtain a warrant is benefi-
cial to privacy interests. McKenna, supra note 19, at 80-81; see United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S.
297, 326-33 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S.
102, 105-06 (1965).
136. Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 482 (5th Cir.
1982) (per curiam), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3686 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1983)
(No. 82-1510); Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662, 671 (10th Cir. 1981); M.M. v.
Anker, 607 F.2d 588, 589 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp.
1012, 1024 (N.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other ground per curiam,
631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981); People v. Jackson, 65
Misc. 2d 909, 910-11, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733 (App. Term 1971), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d
734, 284 N.E.2d 153, 333 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1972). Contra State v. Mora, 330 So. 2d
900, 901 (La.) (probable cause required), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976).
137. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2164 (1982); Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42, 48-52 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149-62 (1925).
138. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
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forts. ' " A far heavier burden is currently imposed when the govern-
ment seeks a warrant to search for large quantities of allegedly ob-
scene materials for the sole purpose of destroying them. In such a
situation, the Supreme Court has held that a pre-seizure adversarial
hearing is required 140 to avoid abridging the right of the public to
unobstructed circulation of nonobscene books.14 ' If the court deter-
mines that the materials are in fact obscene, they are outside the scope
of the first amendment and a warrant will be issued.' 42 This proce-
dural requirement is absent, however, when the materials sought are
narcotics or gambling paraphernalia,' 43 which are plainly outside the
scope of the first amendment. Similarly, in situations in which privacy
expectations are diminished, officers may look for contraband without
first obtaining a warrant; they may riffle a prisoner's diary' 44 or a
139. See Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, § 210.3(2); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 17-5-21(a)(5) (1982). Both of the above specifically exclude private papers that
were not used in the commission of an offense from inclusion in a search warrant. Cf.
19 C.F.R. § 145.3 (1982) (customs officials prohibited from reading of correspon-
dence absent a search warrant). Customs officials are, however, permitted to open
packages without a warrant if they have reason to believe the packages contain
contraband. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 623-24 (1977).
140. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 491 (1973) (dictum); A Quantity of Copies
of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 213 (1964) (plurality opinion); Marcus v. Search
Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731 (1961); State v. Bumanglag, 634 P.2d 80, 87 n.8 (Hawaii
1981); People v. Foote, 104 Ill. App. 3d 581, 584, 432 N.E.2d 1254, 1256-57 (1982).
Furthermore, "[w]here the materials sought . . . may be protected by the First
Amendment, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment must be applied with
'scrupulous exactitude.' "Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978) (quot-
ing Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965); see T. Taylor, supra note 20, at 66.
Even when police are attempting to seize a single copy of an allegedly obscene film
for the bona fide purpose of using it as evidence in a criminal proceeding, the first
amendment requires a prompt post-seizure adversarial hearing and permitting the
exhibitor to continue showing the film until that hearing is held. 413 U.S. at 492-93;
G.I. Distribs. v. Murphy, 490 F.2d 1167, 1168 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
939 (1974).
141. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 491 (1973).
142. See Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 738 (1961); J. Hall, supra note
2, § 14:6, at 449; Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 Harv. L. Rev. 518,
518-20 (1970).
Some commentators have suggested that private papers should be absolutely im-
mune from seizure, with or without a warrant, because of the magnitude of the
intrusiveness of such a search. See, e.g., 1. W. LaFave, supra note 7, § 2.6, at 395-
96; T. Taylor, supra note 20, at 63-71. Proper consideration of the merits of such a
proscription is beyond the scope of this Note.
143. A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1964)
(plurality opinion).
144. DiGuiseppe v. Ward, 514 F. Supp. 503, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 698
F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1983); cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 575 (1974) (opening,




student's notebook to see if the contraband is concealed therein but
they may not, without first obtaining a warrant, read the material
seized.
CONCLUSION
Private papers unquestionably enjoy the protection of the first
amendment. This protection, however, is not adequately ensured
under current fourth amendment analysis. This analysis requires a
threshold determination whether a reasonable expectation of privacy
has been infringed upon. In part, this determination turns on whether
the expectation manifested is one society regards as reasonable. With
respect to private papers, the protections afforded by the first amend-
ment are evidence of society's regard for such values.
Application of the first amendment as a factor in determining
objective reasonableness requires that courts look beyond the expecta-
tion of privacy in the place wherein the object is located, to the
expectation of privacy associated with the object itself. Proper incor-
poration of the first amendment factor at the threshold stage of fourth
amendment inquiry will more fully serve the underlying purposes of
both these amendments.
Suzanne M. Berger
